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"Sartor Resartus"t
(The Tailor Retailored)
BY GRAHAM SUSMAN*
Otis Williams, a storekeeper in Granite Falls, North Carolina, a
middle-aged father of four, fell in love with plump Lillie Hendrix, wife
of the store's handyman. With romance in their hearts they drove west
to Las Vegas, Nevada, where they found the housing problem to be as
acute as elsewhere in the country. They settled down to a six-week vacation in a transient auto court, obtained Nevada divorces, immediately
remarried in Nevada, and returned home in anticipation of a happy
future. Little did they realize as they chugged their way across the continent that they were setting the wheels in motion in a legal proceeding
which would twice bring their case to the North Carolina Supreme Court
and twice to the United States Supreme Court. Nor did they realize that
the result of their action would seriously affect the lives and the future of
countless thousands who had obtained non-contested decrees-regardless
of where they had been entered.
Upon their return to North Carolina, they were arrested for bigamous cohabitation, 1 and the jury found them guilty, refusing to give
recognition to the Nevada decrees and their subsequent remarriage. The
case was appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, where it was
affirmed. 2 An appeal was then taken to the United States Supreme
Court, which reversed the state court in Williams I.3 It must be noted,
however, that in this decision the question of residence and domicile was
not raised on appeal, but was predicated upon the theory that one state
was not bound to recognize a foreign divorce decree, based upon substituted service where the defendant made no appearance. Such had been
the rule for many years on the authority of the Haddock case, 4 which
was thereupon expressly overruled. The court held that each state must
give full faith and credit to the judicial acts, records, and decrees of every
tA sequel to "So You Want a Nevada Divorce," 21 DICTA 6, June, 1944.
*Of the Denver bar.
1
Sec. 14-183 Gen. Stat. of N. C. (1943).
2
State vs. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1941).
'Williams vs. No. Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 87 L. Ed. 279, 63 S. Ct. 207, 143
A. L. R. 1273 (1943).
'Haddock vs. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
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other state, and that North Carolina must give effect to the Nevada
decrees.
In its decision, however, the Supreme Court was careful to point
out that no attack had been made by the State of North Carolina on the
question of the bona fides of the defendants' residence in Nevada, and
that "it must treat the present case * * * precisely the same as if petitioners had resided in Nevada for a term of years and had long ago
acquired a permanent abode there." Under such circumstances, the court
gave effect to the full faith and credit clause and held the Nevada decree
to be good. It added, however, a qualifying statement, which left open
the issue as to whether one state could questian the bona fides of the
domicile acquired in another. The court said:
"Nor do we reach the question as to the power of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to findings of the Nevada Court, North Carolina
finds that no bona fide domicile was acquired in Nevada."
Newspapers and lawyers throughout the country pointed to this
decision as proof that Nevada divorce decrees had reached a point of
legal respectability and Nevada divorce business continued to grow. In
fact, the publicity was so widespread that one court 5 took judicial notice
thereof and said:
"Were it not for the misleading press notices and the generally confused discussion of the Williams case * * * it would
scarcely be necessary to point out the limited effect of this decision."
But the dignity of the State of North Carolina had not yet been
vindicated, and the storekeeper and his newly acquired wife were again
promptly arrested, tried, and again found guilty. On appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Couit, the conviction was affirmed, 6 and again it was
brought to the United States Supreme Court7 on the precise question that
the court had failed to answer in Williams I.
In a six to three decision, Justice Frankfurter writing the opinion
for the three justices whose views were expressed in "The opinion of
the court," the court held that North Carolina could determine for itself
whether the parties were so domiciled in Nevada as to confer jurisdiction
there. The court pointed out that after a contest upon jurisdictional
questions, these cannot be re-litigated as between the parties,8 but those
not parties, snould not be so foreclosed, especially a state which is
concerned with the vindication of its own policy, and has no other means
to protect that interest against the selfish action of those outside its
3

Commonwealth vs. Esenwein, 153 Pa. Supr. 69, 33 Ati. (2d) 675 (1943).
'State vs. Williams, 224 N. C. 183, 29 S. E. (2d) 744 (1944).
'Williams vs. No. Carolina, 65 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1123 (1945).
'But see contra Solotoff vs. Solotoff, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 510 (1945).
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borders. If such findings were conclusive, the policy of each state in
matters of most intimate concern could be subverted by the policy of
every other state.
The court added that a divorce decree must be respected by all the
states, provided "the conditions for the exercise of power by the divorcedecreeing court are validly established whenever that judgment is elsewhere called into question. In short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except the jurisdictional fact upon which
it is founded, and domicile is a jurisdictional fact. To permit the necessary finding of domicile by one state to foreclose other states in the protection of their social institutions would be intolerable."
Justice Rutledge, in a strong and vigorous dissent, pointed out that
the decree is valid in Nevada-based upon evidence presented to that
court-and the subsequent marriage of the parties in Nevada is also
valid. If it is concededly valid, then neither North Carolina nor anyone
else can qualify it by saying it shall not be effective in North Carolina,
while it is effective in Nevada, and stands without impeachment.
Justice Black discussed the uncertainty caused by the decision, and
stated that the court's opinion "will cast a cloud over the lives of countless numbers of the multitude of divorced persons in the United States
* * * it undermines and makes uncertain the validity of every uncontested divorce decree. It wipes out every semblance of their finality and
decisiveness * * * the result is to classify divorced persons in a distinctive and invidious category."
Justice Murphy in a separate concurring opinion takes issue with
Justice Black, and states that "there are no startling or dangerous implications in the judgment * * * all of the uncontested divorces that
have ever been granted in the forty-eight states are as secure today as
they were yesterday, or as they were before our previous decision in this
case. Those based upon fraudulent domiciles are now and always have
been subject to later re-examination with possible serious consequences."
It is apparent that this decision not only affects the finality of Nevada decrees, but opens up the right of any state to question the validity
of a non-contested decree obtained in another. It weighs one state public
policy against that of another. No final determination of its own jurisdiction can therefore be made by a state court in a non-contested case.
9
And since domicile involves a mixed question of law and fact, it is possible for a jury in one state to uphold the decree while a jury in another
will reach an opposite conclusion, based upon the same identical evidence.
Who can know, therefore, or guess what rights he may exercise upon a
divorce decree obtained in another state? How far can he rely thereon?
'19 Corpus Juris 441.
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It is true that many of the states have followed the right to question such foreign decrees even prior to Williams II. In Colorado our
Supreme Court has recently held to the same effect in denying validity
to a Nevada decree. 10
This case was decided after the decision in Williams I, but before
Williams II. The husband, who had been a resident of Colorado, went
to Nevada, stayed the required time, and obtained a decree of divorce in
his favor. The wife was personally served with summons in Colorado,
but did not appear in the suit either personally or by attorney. After he
obtained the decree, the husband returned to Colorado, where he resumed
his residence. The lower court found that the husband had gone to
Nevada solely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, but held with
expressed reluctance that Williams I precluded any inquiry by a Colorado court into the fact findings of the Nevada court on jurisdictional
matters, and compelled recognition under the full faith and credit
clause. The Supreme Court ruled that it was not so precluded, and
that a foreign divorce decree entered upon such service is invalid if obtained by one not bona fide domiciled within the jurisdiction of the
court granting the divorce. The court held that the Williams decision
"did not disturb the pre-existing rule that a court of a state within whose
jurisdiction neither one of the parties to a divorce suit is a bona fide domicile has no jurisdiction to render a divorce decree which would be binding in other states under the full faith and credit clause."
If the State of Colorado may question the jurisdiction of the Nevada court or the domicile of a successful party in that court, then the
Nevada court may likewise question a decree obtained in Colorado. And
while the Colorado court or jury may be satisfied that it had jurisdiction
to enter a decree, a Nevada court or jury may decide otherwise on the
same evidence. Consider the status of a woman who marries a man who
has just obtained a divorce decree and marries in reliance upon its validity. Must she be compelled to retain counsel to ascertain whether her
new husband had sufficiently established his domicile in the state decreeing the divorce? And since the matter of domicile is one upon which
men may reasonably differ, how certain can she be after the ascertainment
of such fact? Perhaps a jury in another state may think otherwise.
The public is entitled to know once and for all whether a Nevada
divorce is good or no good-without equivocation; whether a man's second marriage is valid -or whether he is just living with a mistress;
whether his children begotten by his second marriage are legitimate or
not; whether his first wife is married to someone else, or whether her
marriage is also void; whether her children are legitimate or not; whether
'0 Koscove vs. Koscove.
1945.)

113 Colo. -,

156 P. (2d)

696.

(Decided Feb. 26
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his first or second wife is entitled to his estate upon his death, et cetera
and ad infinitum.
It is not enough to say that it all depends on whether he intended
to make his home in Nevada at the time the decree was entered, regardless of what the Nevada court found on this subject; that it depends
further on what some jury in another state, even years afterwards, may
determine what was in his mind when in Nevada; or what he did after
he obtained his decree; that his status and that of his former spouse and
even of his freedom shall depend upon the finding of a jury upon the
debatable question of domicile-and which question could be raised in
any and every state he might enter.
Consider the poor traveling salesman who had obtained a Nevada
decree, married, and is traveling across the country with his new wife. It
would be incumbent upon him to ascertain in every state he entered
whether he was lawfully married therein, or whether he was a bigamist.
And even if his lawyer traveled with him, he could be of little help, as
the determination of that question could only be made by a local jury
in every state.
The United States Supreme Court has heretofore held 1 that when
the defendant enters a special appearance in a case prosecuted in a state
other than that of his residence, for the sole purpose of raising a question
of jurisdiction, and the decision is adverse to such contention, the question of jurisdiction becomes res adjudicata and cannot again be litigated.
In fact, this is mentioned in Williams II when the court, speaking of
jurisdictional questions, stated: "After a contest, these cannot be re-litigated as between the parties."
The theory thereunder is to give the opposite party an opportunity
to present his contentions, and a recital of the jurisdiction in such a
divorce decree is not subject to attack anywhere.l Why could not this
theory, or principle, be extended to default cases where the defendant
has.been properly served with process, and is given an opportunity to
present his evidence, but chooses not to do so? Must the validity of a
jurisdictional recital in a decree be based upon whether or not there had
been a contest? This is not the test used in other types of civil proceedings.
The right of a state to collaterally attack decrees entered in another,
casts doubt upon the validity of all divorces which have been obtained
by resort to the courts of another state. Lawyers and judges have been
seeking a way out of the confusion. In Colorado two bills were passed
by the 1945 Legislature on the subject. Senate Bill 57 provided in effect
that no decree of divorce entered-by a court of this state, or another state,
'Davis vs. Davis, 305 U. S. 32, 83 L. Ed. 26, 59 Sup. Ct. 3.

"See Note 8.
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shall indefinitely remain subject to impeachment here, provided it appears that (1) the court which entered the decree was vested with jkirisdiction to grant divorce decrees and (2) that such court determined that
it had jurisdiction to grant said decree. It provided further for a one year
limitation on impeachment if the defendant was personally served with
process, or accepted, or waived service, or otherwise entered his appearance, and a two year limitation on impeachment in all other cases. Section 3 of the bill outlines its purpose in the-following language:
"In order to foster and preserve the integrity of conjugal relations, and the stability of family ties, and to protect children born
to parents one or both of whom may previously have been married
and divorced, and other innocent persons affected thereby, from the
turmoil, indignity, and notoriety attendant upon proceedings, the
purpose of which is to inquire into the regularity of divorce proceedings to ifivalidate the same, and in order to render definite and
certain the status of divorced persons, the General Assembly hereby
finds, determines, and declares the public policy of this state to be
that decrees of divorce, regular on their face, whether entered by the
courts of this state, or of any other state, territory, or commonwealth within the United States, should not be questioned for any
cause whatsoever after the lapse of a reasonable time as in this Act
is provided: and to effectuate this policy, this Act shall be liberally
construed."
Senate Bill 58 provided, inter alia, that when a final decree of divorce of this state, or any other state, is attacked, a certified copy of such
decree shall be admitted in evidence without further proof of its genuineness, and when so admitted, shall be prima facie proof (1) that said
decree of divorce was duly made and entered, (2) that the court, if it be
a foreign court, was vested with jurisdiction to grant decrees of divorce
by the laws of the state wherein it was entered, and (3) that the cQurt
which entered the decree determined that it had jurisdiction to grant the
decree, and that it had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter
of the cause.
The two bills were vetoed on March 1, .1945, by Governor Vivian,
who doubted their constitutionality and who asserted that the bills
would "certainly furnish ample opportunity of committing fraud in
divorce actions."
The State of Delaware recently passed a bill allowing recognition
-by Delaware courts to divorces or annulments granted in other states
and foreign countries. Bills to broaden the grounds for divorces have
been introduced in various states by proponents who contend that out-
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of-state divorces of questionable validity should be averted by relaxing
and unifying the divorce laws of all states.'"
Justice Rutledge believes that the courts should avoid the tremendous confusion resulting from its decision by definitely adopting one of
two policies: first, by ruling that transient divorces, founded on fly-bynight residence, are invalid where rendered, as well as elsewhere, and
second, an opposite policy frankly conceding state power to grant transient or short term divorces, provided due process requirements for giving
notice to the other spouse were complied with. In his view, the opinion
in*Williams II gives effect to neither one of these theories. It is a compromise which vitiates both "and does so in a manner wholly capricious
alike for the institutional and the individual aspects of the problem."'
There is considerable merit to both of these suggestions. By the
adoptiQn of either of them, objective standards of proof would apply
instead of the highly variable common law conception of domicile. The
trouble with domicile; says Justice Rutledge, is its dependence upon a
state of mind. "It can be changed in a twinkling of an eye-the time it
takes a man to make up his mind to remain where he is when he is away
from home. He need do no more than decide, by a flash of thought, to
stay either permanently, or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.
No legal conception, save possibly 'jurisdiction' * * * affords such
possibilities for uncertain application."
While the difficulty of working out any system is apparent-so
long as each of the forty-eight states can now determine their own policies and laws, still some solution to the problem must be found. The
importance of the question should stimulate profound thought and study
by serious-minded judges, lawyers and legislators,, who appreciate that
in our social structure certainty must be substituted for doubt in the
matter of marriage, divorce and legitimacy of children.
And what about Otis Williams and Lillie Hendrix, who still languish in jail, despite the fact that Williams' first wife has since died and
Lillie's former husband has since remarried?

Colorado Bar Association ANNUAL MEETING
It has just been definitely decided-that the annual meeting will be
held October 18, 19 and 20 at the Broadmoor Hotel. It is suggested
that you write immediately for reservations, which will be limited to
150 in the hotel. Further announcement of the program will be made
through the Public Ledger or the next issue of DICTA.
"Legislation which would have required Florida to recognize divorces obtained
"inother jurisdictions" was vetoed by Governor Caldwell on the grounds that it was
too broad and might result in validating decrees outside the United States.

